




United States  
Joint Forces Command  
and the  
United States Army

# Unified Quest 04

Executive Report



# Key War Game 2004 Participants

## ***Intelligence Agencies***

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

National Air and Space Intelligence Center

National Reconnaissance Office

Office of Naval Intelligence

US Army Intelligence and Security Command

## ***Joint Commands***

US Joint Forces Command

US Northern Command

US Strategic Command

US Space Command

US Special Operations Command

US Transportation Command

## ***Services***

Department of the Air Force

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Headquarters Coast Guard

Headquarters Marine Corps

## ***Other Government and Department of Defense***

III Corps

Air Force Operational Test & Evaluation Center

Air Force Special Operations Command

Air Mobility Command

Army Science Board

Center for Strategic Leadership

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Joint Staff

Joint Information Operations Center

Joint Warfare Analysis Center

Military Sealift Command

National Security Council

Naval War College

Naval Operational Logistics Support Center

Navy Special Warfare Command

Naval Warfare Development Command

Office of the Chief of Army Reserve

OSD

US Congress

Senate Armed Services Committee

State Department

## ***Army Major Commands***

Army Materiel Command

Forces Command

Medical Command

Space and Missile Defense Command

Special Operations Command

Training and Doctrine Command

## ***Army Training Centers***

Combined Arms Center

Combined Arms Support Command

Maneuver Support Center

## ***Army Analysis Centers***

TRADOC Analysis Center

Strategic Studies Institute

Task Force Logistics

## ***Other Organizations and Agencies***

Alion Science and Technology

Booz Allen Hamilton

Brown University

California Poly Technical Institute

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Defense Daily

Jane's Defence Weekly

Institute for Defense Analyses

Institute for National Strategic Studies NDU

Lexington Institute

NetAge, Inc.

RAND

Sandia National Laboratories

## ***International Participants***

Australian Army, Navy

British Army, Navy

Canadian Defense Force

Finnish Army

French Army

German Army

Greek Army

Israel Defense Force

Italian Army

Philippine Army

Swedish Army

## ***Army Schools***

Adjutant General

Air Defense

Armor

Army War College

Aviation

Chemical

Command and General Staff College

Engineer

Field Artillery

Infantry

Intelligence

JFK Special Warfare Center & School

Military Police

Quartermaster

Signal

Transportation

## **Preface**

This report summarizes the United States Army Title 10 War Game, Unified Quest 2004, co-sponsored with Joint Forces Command in fiscal year 2004. The objective of this effort was to gain perspectives on a wide range of operational and tactical issues related to the evolving suite of Joint, Service, Interagency, and Multinational concepts, with a particular emphasis on Joint Forces Command's Major Combat Operations and Stability Operations Concepts and the Army's Future Force Concepts. This war game was undertaken to explore a conflict in which the combined U.S. and coalition military capability is so overwhelmingly superior in the conventional dimension that a future adversary chooses to adopt a combination of conventional and unconventional operations, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) employment, seeking to protract the conflict while negotiating a settlement. It is in this context that the Army and Joint Forces Command explored methods to counter an adversary's adaptation.

This report should be of special interest to those who are exploring the effect of the information age on the conduct of warfare. It should also be of interest to those segments of the U.S. and the broader international security community that are concerned with the post-cold war transformation of the military forces.

The war game results reported here were identified within the Future Warfare and Wargaming Divisions of the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command's Futures Center's Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate and the Joint Forces Command's Joint Experimentation Concept Development team. The insights build on earlier and ongoing war games, studies, and analyses within these organizations and across the services on the conduct of future warfare.



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## SUMMARY

This executive report is the culmination of two years of studies, wargaming and analysis conducted during the years of 2002 through 2004. The central study question driving the effort was:

***What are the concepts and capabilities required to counteract an adversary who seeks decision through a combination of protracted, conventional and unconventional operations, and WMD employment?***

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Future Center's Future Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate (Future Warfare and Wargaming Divisions) and the Joint Forces Command's Joint Experimentation (Joint Concept Experimentation Pathway Team) co-sponsored the wargame which is the annual capstone event in the study.

The title "Unified Quest" signifies that the undertaking was a campaign of discovery to explore the application of all elements of national and international power to achieve strategic ends. Set in the year 2015, Unified Quest 2003 focused on the initial phases of a major contingency campaign and explored many of the precepts for our developing concepts. It also exposed a persistent set of issues related to adversaries who would adapt to our overwhelming conventional strength by adopting unconventional strategies. Unified Quest 2004 began where Unified Quest 2003 ended and continued the exploration of the problems focusing on decisive operations, stability operations, and post-conflict.

This report is based on initial analysis of the results of the 2004 series of events, and it reflects the insights discussed with senior Defense Department officials at the culminating Senior Leader Seminar conducted after the close of the major war game event in May of 2004.

The joint TRADOC Analysis Center/Joint Forces Command analysis report provides more in-depth analysis of these and other insights from the study.

In the body of this report, we offer a synopsis of the key insights from both the 2003 and 2004 war games while covering the 2004 insights in more detail on the pages that follow. However, it is worthy to note two points of some consequence before proceeding. First, we gave ourselves great credit for the success of our forcible entry and shaping operations in 2003, but as we continued the scenario in 2004, we discovered a number of insights that we never would have identified had we not continued the scenario. Fundamentally, any war game that does not work backwards from the context of achievement of a strategic end state risks producing faulty analysis. Second, we may have been asking the wrong question. Rather than assume that the adversary is a conventional opponent that adapts as the conflict evolves, we should consider that from the start of a U.S. led intervention, the adversary applies both conventional and WMD capabilities (primarily designed for use against internal and regional adversaries) unconventionally against the U.S. There is a great deal of work that needs to be done from these two perspectives.

### Conclusions

The emerging insights from this study suggest that we need to revisit our approach to the initial phases of the campaign in order to appreciate the impact of scale, problem complexity, adversary adaptiveness on the level of risk in our operational designs.

Our institutions must continue to develop forces and concepts that provide the capabilities to operate effectively in the emerging operating environments against our projected adversaries,

but those efforts only get us as far as our assumptions allow. When future commanders are charged with executing the nation's security strategy, they will have at their disposal only what we were able to build with less than perfect foresight. So we must also provide those commanders with the knowledge, command systems and doctrinal underpinnings to be able to continually assess and understand the true nature of the emerging environment and adaptive adversaries. They must be able to adapt in turn orchestrating unique combinations and sequences of the generic tactical means at their disposal to achieve the emerging strategic intent.

The forces we develop today, to provide capabilities to the commanders of tomorrow, must be effective against a broad range of adversaries, in a broad range of environments

and missions. We must balance the desire for rapidity of action with the requirements of adaptation and the sustainability of a campaign.

Our future security challenges require the cohesive effort of all elements of national and international power. Military action alone — absent diplomatic, information and economic action — will be less than adequate. There is an urgent need for developing the means to take unified action.

From the perspective of discovery and exploration, the games were a success, for they raised more questions than they answered. The challenge remains to act on what we have learned, translating it into actionable recommendations, and to use these new questions to refine our concepts and reshape our campaign of learning.

## Unified Quest

### War Game Overview

In September of 2002, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) leadership reviewed its future warfare study process and developed a two-year war-game cycle with major war-game events in the spring of each year. The 2002 study (Vigilant Warrior 2002) had broken new ground by exploring strategic and operational issues within a future, global scenario of multiple conflicts and tensions. Although the game yielded several important issues within the future operating environment, the scope and complexity of the problem defied adequate investigation in a one-year cycle.

The Unified Quest study design has several unique characteristics. TRADOC formed a partnership with Joint Forces Command that allowed for a co-sponsorship of the study's major event, the Army's premier war game. The game


retained the context of a complex global scenario with multiple tensions and conflicts, and player teams focused on two strategic problems: a major combat operation to affect regime change and to gain control of weapons of mass effects against a major regional power in Southwest Asia, and a smaller-scale contingency in Southeast Asia in support of a near-failing state in a counter insurgency operation. The study spanned a two-year cycle to allow for exploration of an entire campaign. In each year, the process of exploring issues began in multiple planning venues carried through preparatory workshops and the major war-game event, and culminated with a seminar conducted with the participation of senior service, joint, defense, and other government officials.

In Unified Quest 2004, the context of the later stages of conflict allowed for exploration of issues that would not be possible in a traditional

## The Problem: Blue Action-Red Reaction<sup>1</sup>

### *The Adaptive Threat . . . Regional non-peer competitor*

- “Blue’s overwhelming conventional strength will change Red’s investments, options, and strategy.”<sup>2</sup>
- “These new threats . . . seek to avoid our strengths [and] make many of our long-held assumptions irrelevant . . .”<sup>3</sup>



**Figure 1. The Adaptive Threat**

game design. The central study question centered on the insight from the 2003 game concerning Red's adaptation to Blue's overwhelming conventional strength, specifically: "What are the concepts and capabilities required to counteract an adversary who, having lost most of his conventional capability, seeks decision through a combination of protracted, unconventional operations and WMD employment?"

The following objectives were developed to focus on the unique issues within that problem and to inform concept development:

- Major Combat Operations (MCO) – Explore concepts for the application of national, joint, combined and service capabilities to defeat adversary forces and establish stable conditions for conflict termination to inform the MCO Joint Operating Concept.
- Transition to Post Conflict – Explore concepts for the application of national, joint, combined, and service capabilities to
- transition from decisive operations to conflict termination and post-conflict operations to inform Major Combat Operations and Stability Operations Joint Operating Concepts.
- Stability Operations – Explore the concepts, capabilities, and force designs required to conduct simultaneous major combat and stability operations in a distributed, non-contiguous battlespace to inform the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept.
- Network Enabled Battle Command – Explore network enabled battle command and the Unit of Employment's (Division) ability to conduct shaping and decisive operations in urban terrain in order to support the FY05 Army Concept Development and Experimentation Plan and the Major Combat Operations and Stability Operations Joint Operating Concepts.

War game objectives and study issues from the other services and Special Operations Command were developed and tracked within the context of the four objectives listed above.

### **Unified Quest 04 Events**

Unified Quest 04 was a series of activities that culminated with the Senior Leader Seminar held May 10, 2004 at the National Defense University. The series included eleven interrelated events:

**Future Warfare Seminar, Phase I**, 14-17 October 2003. The seminar involved a diverse group of working level experts and focused on identifying the major issues of future warfare and suggesting a strategy for exploring those issues.

**Blue National Security Seminar**, 12-13 November 2003. A national level scenario-based political/military seminar designed to produce strategic guidance for campaign planning and the conduct of the operational game.

**Force Projection Workshop**, 18-21 November 2003. A four-day, scenario-based seminar involving subject matter experts from across the Department of Defense. The purpose of the workshop was to explore issues related to advanced-lift concepts, joint sea basing, and the integration of deployment, employment, and sustainment processes.

**Red Future Technologies Seminar**, 18-20 November 2003. A three-day seminar to explore future technology developments that might be available to potential adversaries to assist in developing Red's force capabilities.

**Red National Security Seminar**, 2-3 December 2003. A two-day seminar to establish global and regional strategies for Red player teams.

**STAFFEX I**, 8-12 December 2003. Player staffs conducted course of action development and campaign planning for their respective operations in Unified Quest.

**STAFFEX II**, 2-6 February 2004. Player staffs refined campaign plans and developed detailed plans to support the tactically-focused case studies.

**Future Warfare Seminar, Phase II**, 29 March - 1 April 2004. Experts with various perspectives discussed the subject of countering guerrilla warfare with the Unified Quest commanders and mentors (Blue and Red) in order to identify the concepts and capabilities required to counteract an adversary who has adopted an unconventional warfare strategy.

**Operations Workshop**, 19-23 April 2003. Players, assessors, analysts and game direction elements conducted a full rehearsal of the war-game process. The workshop included assessment of two game turns and set the starting conditions for the May war game.


**Unified Quest 04**, 2-7 May 2004. The main war-game event with over 500 participants in four case studies. Teams conducted final two game turns over the six-day event. Insights developed during the game were the basis for the Senior Leader Seminar conducted the following week.

**Senior Leader Seminar**, 10 May 2004. Senior players and mentors presented the major issues and insights of the series to joint and service leadership.

### **War Game Design**

The game design provided a platform for the examination of the major issues associated with the war-game objectives. It consisted of four semi-independent case studies, each conducted as a combination of planning exercise, model assisted assessment, and facilitated seminar discussion. Two cases were based on player panels that acted as joint and combined headquarters conducting simultaneous operations in the 2016-2017 timeframe. The Nair operational panel conducted major combat





**Figure 2. Game Construct**

operations against a regional power in Southwest Asia. The Sumesia operational panel conducted smaller-scale contingency operations to support counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia. These two cases shared the same strategic setting and competed for limited forces and other resources. Two tactical level case studies focused on a tactical problem of operations in a large urban environment within the Nair operational setting; one case used future forces and concepts, the other explored issues of applying future concepts with current force


organizations and capabilities. Three cases included interactive play against a live opposing force; the current force tactical case did not.

### Unified Quest 04 Scenario

The scenario for Unified Quest 04 was a continuation of that for Unified Quest 03. The strategic setting for 2015, consistent with the Joint Forces Command's Joint Operational Environment, was developed based upon a common understanding of eleven critical variables<sup>1</sup> that describe the operational

1. Physical Environment, Status of the State, Sociological Demographics, Regional/Global Relationships, Military Capabilities, Technology, Information, External Organizations, National Will, Time and Economics.

## The World in 2015



**Crises linked via economic and socio-political interests, energy concerns, international terrorism, and international crime**

**Figure 3. Strategic Setting**

environment of tomorrow's battle space. It was designed to present a world in turmoil with challenging security environments and adaptive, capable opponents. Unified Quest presented America's joint forces with multiple, simultaneous military crises that were linked by interrelated economic and socio-political interests, energy concerns, international terrorism, and international crime. The global situation evoked a global campaign that included two overlapping major combat operations. Specifically, a major conflict unfolded in Southwest Asia as the nation-state of Nair began to threaten that region's stability. After more than fifteen years of economic growth and military modernization, Nair had emerged as a major regional power with political and military ties to Russia. It had a

full range of WMD and was within 30 days of possessing the means of delivering nuclear weapons to the continental US. Simultaneously, in Southeast Asia, several years of criminal and subversive activity destabilized the government of Sumesia. As insurgent groups backed by the New Independent Movement (NIM) threatened Ajkarat, the capital, the United States agreed to join the United Kingdom and Australia to restore the government of Sumesia's control throughout its territory. The NIM, through its ties to Nair, had access to WMD and through terrorist networks, had the means to threaten the US homeland. As global events unfolded, the United States' homeland faced threats against critical infrastructure posed by the capabilities of both adversaries.

The setting for Unified Quest 2004 was designed to drive game play toward the four major game objectives. The interrelated global elements stressed the ability of Blue to integrate global and regional operations. The choice of geography and conditions for the two operational

scenarios created a balanced requirement for capabilities from each service thereby stressing the integration of joint, service, interagency, and multinational concepts and driving issues related to joint effects generation.

## Insights

The following insights were derived from the observations of senior players and mentors, game analysts and game direction leadership throughout the Unified Quest series. Many of these insights are reinforced by observations from other service and joint war games as well as lessons from current operations.

### Unified Quest 2003 and 2004 Major Insights

This section lists the most salient observations and insights from both the 2003 and 2004 studies, while the remainder of the report focuses solely on the 2004 results. Observations and insights are categorized under the six key ideas of the Army's Future Force Concept as described below:

#### Networked Enabled Battle Command:

- "Blue's overwhelming conventional strength may change Red's investments, options, and strategy." (UQ03)
- "Situational understanding and the conduct of operations improve when Joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is linked directly to the Joint Force and subordinate task force commanders' decision requirements." (UQ03)

- "Nothing is strictly a regional crisis or conflict...they all have global impacts." (UQ03)
- "Complexity and span of command drive numbers of echelons to conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability and support operations." (UQ03)
- "Homeland Security is measured by a concerted unity of effort and the level of Joint, Interagency and Multinational actionable coordination." (UQ03)
- "We are currently unable to fuse, analyze, synthesize and display the vast amounts of available data in ways that contribute to effective battle command." (UQ04)
- "A Joint Interagency Coordination Group at the Combatant Command level was necessary but not sufficient to enable interagency unity of effort throughout the campaigns." (UQ04)

#### Operational Maneuver from Strategic Distances:

- "Countering area denial starts with peacetime theater security cooperation. We can achieve some degree of maneuvering Joint Forces from strategic and operational distances, but not total liberation from the tyranny of distance and time." (UQ03)

### Intra-theater Operational Maneuver:

- “Joint Sea Basing (JSB) enhanced Blue’s ability to deploy, maneuver, protect and sustain forces.” (UQ03)
- “Operational art is a crucial element enabling us to compete effectively with emerging rivals and strategic complexities.” (UQ04)

### Entry and Shaping Operations:

- “Countering Red area denial is a Joint Operation in itself that is a continuous fight.” (UQ03)

### Decisive Maneuver:

- “During both campaigns, seeking distinct transition from major combat operations to stability operations hindered attainment of strategic aims.” (UQ04)
- “The Joint Force needs new concepts and doctrine for operating in or around megacities or urbanized regions.” (UQ04)
- “In very large-scale operations, the inclusion of coalition members becomes a matter of necessity, not choice.” (UQ04)
- “Efforts to gain indigenous support for US operational aims were largely unsuccessful.” (UQ04)

### Distributed Support and Sustainment:

- “Deployment, employment, and sustainment (D-E-S) are beginning to merge. May need to create a D-E-S system with the ability to support a variety of widely dispersed, non-contiguous, complex Joint Operations – simultaneously.” (UQ03)
- “We could not sustain the desired tempo of operations. Operating six distributed Joint Task Forces revealed issues of force to space, scale, and increasing force effectiveness through joint interdependencies.” (UQ03)

## Unified Quest 04 Insights

### #1 Operational Art

*“Operational art is a crucial element enabling us to compete effectively with emerging rivals and strategic complexities.”*

In the Nair scenario, at the start of move one, Blue initiated six distributed simultaneous operations that would culminate in a seventh operation to control the national capital, a megalopolis of 17 million people. That operational design was in accord with developing operating concepts and went directly to what Blue viewed as Red’s vulnerabilities and center of gravity. But Red adapted to Blue’s operational form in two significant ways. First, he attempted to establish zones of exclusion to make the expeditionary operation untenable, a strategy that was anticipated by, and accounted for, in Blue’s operational design. But that strategy still was challenging at the scale imposed by the scenario. Second, Red took their major corps formations, disaggregated them down to about 85 smaller formations, and went to ground with a large portion of the force. They not only adapted their conventional structure, but they also moved to a wide variety of unconventional operations designed to conceal their operational form and protract the conflict. This second adaptation, although not entirely unpredictable, was not accounted for in Blue’s campaign design, and it confounded Blue’s ability to achieve his strategic objectives.

The object of operational art is to develop, within an emerging strategic environment, a discourse between often-ambiguous strategic direction and a set of generic tactical means. The environment and adversary will be alien at the outset, making patterns of behavior difficult to rationalize. As the adversary learns, adapts, and deliberately hides his true form, rationalization becomes more difficult. Even if the operational “architect” is able to discern adversary patterns and forms, he must be able to orchestrate unique combinations of



generic tactical organizations and capabilities to affect the desired strategic outcomes. Units must be able to depart from prevailing patterns of doctrine to produce relevant forms and combination of maneuver. The process is a recurrent shifting from framing to reframing, from explanation to operation, from reflection to action. All of this must be integrated within a system of command that is an adaptive learning network.

This emerging challenge to our notion of operational art implies four requirements for the practice of operational command in a complex, evolving operating environment. First, we must reframe our understanding of the operational art and the characterization of its unique cognitive traits. Second, we must redefine the cognitive as well as the functional challenges confronting commanders in the operating environment. Third, we need to develop a language and method of thought that facilitates both tactical planning and strategic assessment. Finally, we need to design a system of institutional training and education that will equip operational commanders and staffs with the appropriate tools and faculties to practice the operational art.

## **#2 Support Sustained, Simultaneous, Distributed Operations**

***“We could not sustain the desired tempo of operations. Operating six distributed Joint Task Forces revealed issues of force to space, scale, and increasing force effectiveness through joint interdependencies.”***

In the Nair theater, Blue's objectives were to destroy Red's offensive capability, destroy or capture his weapons of mass destruction (to include nuclear warheads and delivery means), remove the current political regime, and set conditions for the installation of a more democratic regime. To achieve those ends, Blue

elected to conduct operations simultaneously and widely distributed over six lines of operations in order to achieve decisive results with some rapidity. Along each of those lines, Blue had determined that it must conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously; there were no discernable transitions between those types of operations. By the end of move six, along each very long line of operation, Blue was conducting all three operations simultaneously. Consequently, the Joint Force Commander could not maintain the initial tempo of the campaign and was challenged to keep the lines of communication open, putting the overall campaign at risk.

Three points to scalability became clear: ratio of force to space matters; physics affects supportability – there is a finite capacity to support fires, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics, and lift; and the Joint Force Commander must strike a balance between simultaneous and sequential operations relative to aims. Critical aspects of campaign design do not scale linearly; increased scale radically increases the load on joint fires, and scale radically increases both the duration and the difficulty associated with repositioning of major forces. Multiple independent lines of simultaneous operation exponentially increase logistical complexity.

The notion of integrating deployment, employment and sustainment mitigated some of the problems of scale and complexity, but in the case of Nair, systems were still pushed to the point of failure. Although the concept of a Joint Support Command-like organization was not rigorously represented in the game, players believed that such an organization might also mitigate risk.

### **#3 Battle Command: Information, Understanding, and Decision Making**

*“We are currently unable to fuse, analyze, synthesize and display the vast amounts of available data in ways that contribute to effective battle command.”*

In the Sumesia scenario early on 29 January 2016 the adversary appeared to be largely defeated, and the JTF was in the process of shifting the weight of effort to Stability Operations. At this point Red unexpectedly launched a major Tet-like offensive. At the time of the attacks the Blue Headquarters was actually awash in information. Much of it was insignificant noise, some was in service or inter-service stovepipes, and some was actually compartmentalized. But, somewhere in the joint task force there existed that critical grain of actionable information that would have provided adequate warning.

What was not in that headquarters was a clear understanding of Red capabilities and Red intent. This isn't an uncommon occurrence, and clearly, the unprecedented amount of information available to our warfighting headquarters has not yet lifted the fog of war. The volume of information available to the commander does not ensure his understanding of the situation; i.e., awareness does not equal understanding.

Joint concepts and protocols with supporting service doctrine, communications, and improved battle command applications are essential for execution of high tempo, decentralized joint operations. Staffs must be organized and tasked to process effectively the available data and develop knowledge quickly in order to enable rapid, high quality decisions at every echelon. Leader development, training and experience are equally important to prepare commanders and staffs to use available information effectively.

### **#4 Relationship: Major Combat & Stability Operations**

*“During both campaigns, seeking distinct transition from major combat operations to stability operations hindered attainment of strategic aims.”*

In both the Nair and Sumesia scenarios, Blue conceptually compartmented combat and stability operations, viewing them as sequential elements with a distinct transition point. Red, on the other hand, viewed the problem as a continuous application of conventional and unconventional means. This dichotomy creates an exploitable seam at the operational and strategic levels.

The current approach of describing the functions of major combat and stability operations in separate joint operating concepts tends to portray them as discrete operations rather than reinforcing the complexity and coherence of their simultaneous execution. As understood by joint forces, the segmentation opens a vulnerability to an adversary's asymmetric approach. As understood by media, civilian leadership, coalition partners and allies, segmentation creates false expectations for a distinct reduction in the level of violence and a corresponding change in force posture.

We need to develop within our joint concepts an overarching, cohesive description of campaigning that includes major combat (offensive and defensive) operations and stability operations within the context of operational art. It is important not only how this idea is documented and communicated so that it is clearly understood and practiced within the profession, but also how it is communicated and understood outside the defense community.

## **#5 Joint Sea Basing**

***“Joint Sea Basing (JSB) enhanced Blue’s ability to deploy, maneuver, protect and sustain forces.”***

In the Sumesia theater, JSB complemented service capabilities and enabled tailored joint responses (Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore, Army/Air Force Prepositioned Stocks, Maritime Prepositioned Force-Future, Marine Expeditionary Brigade), providing the Joint Force Commander greater flexibility. Blue placed an Army air assault battalion aboard an afloat forward staging base and inserted it near Surabaya with success. They also moved some Government of Sumesia forces almost 1,200 miles by high-speed sealift from the island of Java to northern Sumatra. Sea basing did not just facilitate deployment and sustainment, but maneuver as well. Blue continually conducted offensive, raid-like operations from sanctuary using the Navy’s Sea Shield for protection and the sea as the maneuver space thus reducing vulnerabilities associated with predictability.

Within the Sumesian scenario, where there were few developed internal lines of communication and where sea access to the area of operations was ubiquitous, the Joint Sea Basing concept had much utility. Nair also afforded the opportunity to apply some of the unique capabilities provided by the concept.

The services and JFCOM will need to continue experimentation to fully explore the application of the Joint Sea Basing concept. Particular attention must be given to projecting and sustaining forces from the JSB at a distance greater than 110 nautical miles in order to make the concept viable across a wider range of scenarios.

## **#6 Joint Urban Operations**

***“The Joint Force needs new concepts and doctrine for operating in or around mega-cities or urbanized regions.”***

In both the Sumesian and the Nairian scenarios, there were large, sprawling, densely-populated, urban environments. In the case of Nair, Blue commanders had to deal with Rethan, the Nair capital, of greater than 17 million people in a broad geographic area. Part of the plan in the game’s tactical case included a brigade attack into the city of Rethan. The objective area included a million civilians. The attacking force had on the order of 2,000 infantrymen with a lot of combat multipliers, but the ratio of force to population is a major concern particularly in a hostile city. The Blue commander adopted a “siege and raid” approach which provided some degree of success without the vulnerabilities of large-scale attacks into an urban area.

Adversaries can protract the conflict and protect themselves by occupying mega-cities. They can exert pressure through information operations and world opinion and at the same time create humanitarian crises that complicate military operations. The presence of large populations places legal and humanitarian responsibilities directly on operational and tactical commanders that are for the most part absent in other terrain. In the past we have tried to avoid urban areas, but the trends in demographics and the adversary’s asymmetric approach will force us to confront this challenge.

The joint force and the services need to revisit the problem and develop new concepts and doctrine for operating in and around these mega-cities. The Joint Force needs operating concepts for mega-cities and urbanized regions that provide the means of improving integration between components in mega-cities. We need to consider appropriate command arrangements (Joint Task Force, Major Command), and develop materiel and organizations suited for operations in vast urban complexes.

### **#7 Joint and Interagency**

***“A Joint Interagency Coordination Group at the Combatant Command level was necessary but not sufficient to enable interagency unity of effort throughout the campaigns.”***

In Nair and Sumesia, there was a lack of integration of key governance issues in the campaigns; 100 days into the campaigns, there were still concerns in this area. In both theaters, assumptions involving humanitarian assistance, information operations and restoration of essential services were not fully grounded in external reality, resulting in unanticipated setbacks.

Achieving strategic aims requires more than military action – unity of effort and coherency between military and non-military means is necessary. The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) provides a possible means of achieving that unity within the theater. Each agency within the theater, however, is still reliant on stove-piped channels back to its national-level, parent authority. Additionally, there are multinational aspects which the JIACG does not address.

The JIACG is no substitute for the kinds of prior national level planning that need to take place in order to establish roles and missions, and to resource agencies appropriately to actually conduct the operation. That national-level planning is essential for the theater-level JIACG to be effective in practice.

The JIACG as an RCC or JTF level asset showed some merit. In addition to addressing the multinational aspects, we must provide greater attention to embedding JIACG –like capability at lower levels, perhaps along the lines of the fire support and SOF community approaches to liaison.

### **#8 Multinational Operations**

***“In very large-scale operations, the inclusion of coalition members becomes a matter of necessity, not choice.”***

In the Nair theater alone, non-US forces amounted up to 80,000-100,000 personnel (navy, marines, army and air force), primarily from the United Kingdom and Germany; in Sumesia, Australia naturally played a major role.

Coalition tactical force elements brought volume and expertise, which contributed to operational success and hence strategic impact. The complementary planning effort and fighting power provided by coalition members was as valuable as the political legitimacy that has traditionally been provided. The United States really did need its allies in this large-scale operation; it has become a matter of necessity rather than choice, and allies bring as much materially as symbolically to the effort. Coalition contribution is not just a matter of volume and combat power, rather it is one of expertise and the fact that allies tend to see things through different eyes.

But allies are not unquestioning partners. They will expect a share of the command and control of the coalition, commensurate with their force contributions. The Joint force must continue to work not only to become more inclusive vis-à-vis its coalition partners, it must also continue to work towards improving interoperability across the functional areas.



### **#9 Difficulty in Affecting Popular Will**

***“Efforts to gain indigenous support for US operational aims were largely unsuccessful.”***

The expression of popular will in this game materially affected our strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The adversary had powerful communications means and methods, and in the Nair society, they had very tight coupling between the national religion and civil governance. The global audience listened whether we were characterized as liberators or occupiers, and they listened whether we were considered a source of truth or of propaganda. In the game, Blue was viewed as an occupier rather than liberator.

Blue's purpose did not overcome this predisposition. Nationals defended their

homeland despite discontent with their own government. Blue's message lacked legitimacy and could not generate confidence.

We need to remember how much effort we put into this problem during the Cold War. We sent thousands of officers off to courses to learn languages, to get degrees in studying and understand the Soviets, and the Soviet methods, and cultures, and ways. We have yet to give that kind of emphasis to this part of the world which is now becoming a very serious national security concern.

We need to get our Commanders and leaders deeply involved and grow the “Stillwells of China” of tomorrow in coping with this problem. If we're going to prevail, we're going to have to have a much deeper understanding of how this part of the world works and make sure that that's a mainstream effort of our Commanders.

## **Way Ahead**

The Army Chief of Staff's guidance is to go back to the beginning and do this over again employing the lessons learned from the last gaming cycle. This means that the next two-year game cycle, UQ 05 and UQ 06, will begin with the Nair scenario of UQ 03. We will continue to focus the war game primarily at the operational-tactical levels while using the guidance from our operational-strategic level discussions to frame the war-game environment. Our objectives are to:

- Refine joint, service, multinational, and interagency concepts
- Build on the lessons of our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq
- Support Army, JFCOM, and service experimentation campaign plans.

- Further the Army's Future Warfare Study.

In UQ 05 our requirement is to prepare and posture the force (setting theater conditions) while conducting forcible entry and shaping operations to support and sustain simultaneous distributed operations. Our investigation includes:

- Designing campaigns backwards planning from “Phase V”: We must get beyond transition and describe what the environment must look like after our departure.
- Developing coherent Political-Military plans to frame the strategic environment in a realistic manner.

- Embedding in our backwards planning approaches that favorably affect the adversary's popular will.
- Improving our knowledge of the elements of operational design to provide form to patternless, adaptive adversaries and to help us translate from the abstract (strategic guidance) to the concrete (tactical action).
- Arranging activities in time, space, and purpose as to allow our strategic leadership maximum flexibility without creating vulnerabilities to the employed forces.

- Investigating the detailed requirements, across all the operational functions, necessary to set and sustain the theater conditions for forcible entry and shaping operations.

In Unified Quest 05, we will continue to maintain our intellectual and war-gaming integrity by not entering with preconceived notions, continuing to stress our concepts to failure, and going where our evidence leads. At the end of this game, we will have set the conditions to explore decisive maneuver, urban, security, transition, and reconstruction operations in Unified Quest 06.



***For additional information on the Unified Quest 2004 war game,**  
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